

REMARKS

Claims 1–20 are pending in the application with claims 1, 13, and 19 being the independent claims. No claims are newly added. Claims 6 and 18 are canceled. Claim 4 is amended to correct an informality, and claims 1, 13, and 19 are amended to include limitations from canceled claims 6 and 18. No new matter has been introduced by the amendments. Reconsideration of claims 1–5, 7–17, and 19–20 is respectfully requested in light of the foregoing amendments and the following remarks.

Specification

The Final Office Action objected to the Specification under 35 U.S.C. § 132 as introducing new matter. Applicants have amended the previously added paragraph to include the verbatim language found in claim 13, as originally filed, and respectfully request that the objection be withdrawn.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

The Final Office Action rejected claims 16–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically stating that “Applicants amended specification” modifies the scope of the claimed “computer readable medium” to encompass “a software-only embodiment” and “signals and carrier waves,” which “do not fall within any of the statutory categories.” As noted above, Applicants have amended the previously added paragraph to the Specification and respectfully request that the rejections of claims 16–18 be withdrawn.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103

Claims 1–3, 5–15, and 17–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Myers, et al. (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2004/0122956 A1, hereinafter referred to as “Myers”) in view of Kim, et al. (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2005/0005110 A1, hereinafter referred to as “Kim”). Claims 4 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Myers in view of Kim in further view of Hericourt (U.S. Patent No. 6,792,461). It is submitted that, in the present case, a *prima facie* case of obviousness does not exist for the claims as herein amended for the following, mutually exclusive reasons.

Independent Claim 1

Claim 1 has been amended to include the limitation of dependent claim 6, which has been canceled. Dependent claim 6 has previously been considered by the Examiner; amended claim 1 does not introduce new matter. Specifically, amended independent claim 1 now requires “denying the first router any access to the second network” which is the verbatim limitation from claim 6 (which depended on claim 1).

First, Applicants respectfully note that the Final Office Action stated “Myers fails to explicitly teach . . . access[ing] a first router through the first access point.” Final Office Action, Page 6. Accordingly, Myers cannot teach “denying the first router any access to the second network.”

Regardless, the Final Office Action references Myers at paragraph [0050] as teaching “denying the first router any access to the second network,” which paragraph provides:

The VNS network feature allows for network segmentation. Network segmentation is the ability to take traffic from a specific mobile unit 30 and ensure that it can only be forwarded out a specific interface (called the egress interface). This also ensures that when mobile unit 30 has been assigned to a VNS with network segmentation, it cannot communicate with devices on any other egress interface and when link level encryption is enabled, mobile units 30 cannot view the traffic of mobile units on another VNS as illustrated in FIG. 1B.

Applicants respectfully disagree.

Myers further discloses that “VNS is a network service which allows for the definition of several ‘virtual access controllers’ within a single physical access controller 16.” (paragraph [0049], lines 4–7). Though Myers may provide “network segmentation,” such network segmentation is not accomplished by “denying the first router any access to the second network.” Applicants respectfully contend that Myers providing “several ‘virtual access controllers’ within a single physical access controller” and “[n]etwork segmentation is the ability to take traffic from a specific mobile unit 30 and ensure that it can only be forwarded out a specific interface” is not equivalent to “denying the first router any access to the second network.”

FIGS. 1A and 1B, also referenced by the Final Office Action, are provided below:




FIG. 1A





FIG. 1B

Myers provides that “[w]ireless network 10 can also include a VPN router 54 to provide communication between mobile unit 30 and a customer’s Intranet 52 over back-end network 50 as shown. Specifically, VPN router 54 provides a secure connection between access controller 16 and a device on the Internet 52 by providing a logical connection (i.e., a tunnel over a public network). . . . [A]ccess controller 16 is able to discover VNS factors for the mobile unit communication session and to establish a communication

session such that the mobile unit is connected to the network on the basis of the characteristics defined by the virtual networking services (VNS).” (paragraph [0047]; paragraph [0048], lines 5–9). Clearly, the access controller 16 and the portal 14 may access the back-end network 50, Intranet 52, and Internet 56. Accordingly, Myers does not teach, disclose, or suggest “denying the first router any access to the second network.”

Even when considering Myers in view of Kim, Kim fails to teach “denying the first router any access to the second network.” The Final Office Action suggests that Kim’s router 304 is “a first router.” Final Office Action, Page 6. Kim’s FIG. 3 is provided below, which illustrates that router 304 may access both the Internet 104 and Intranet 200:



Though router 304 may “enable[] internet access for the visitor” as the Final Office Action, page 6 suggests, Kim provides that the router 304 further enables access to the Internet 104 by workstations 100 with intranet access as well by teaching “[t]he corporate intranet 200 is coupled to the internet 104 through a router 304.” (paragraph [0030], lines 9–10). From FIG. 3, Kim teaches that router 304 allows access to the Internet 104 and the Intranet 200, which clearly fails to provide “denying the first router any access to the second network.”

Thus, for this independent reason alone, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should be withdrawn.

Independent Claim 13

Independent claim 13 is also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Myers in view of Kim. It is clear that the Myers and Kim references are not properly combinable since if combined, neither reference teaches “denying the first router any access to the second network” as discussed above in claim 1. Thus, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 with respect to claim 13 should be withdrawn.

Independent Claim 19

Independent claim 19 is also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Myers in view of Kim. It is clear that the Myers and Kim references are not properly combinable since if combined, neither reference teaches “wherein the first router is denied access to the company intranet” as discussed above in claim 1. Thus, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 with respect to claim 19 should be withdrawn.

Dependent Claims 2–5 and 7–12, 14–17, and 20


Dependent claims 2–5 and 7–12, claims 14–17, and claim 20 depend from and add additional features to and/or limit independent claims 1, 13, and 19 respectively. “If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious.” MPEP § 2143.03 citing *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the rejections and allow these claims.

Conclusion

For at least the reasons set forth above, Applicants submit that the pending claims 1–5, 7–17, and 19–20 are in condition for allowance. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the outstanding objections and rejections and issue a formal notice of allowance.

The Office Action contains characterizations of the claims and the related art to which Applicants do not necessarily agree. Unless expressly noted otherwise, Applicants decline to subscribe to any statement or characterization in the Office Action.

Respectfully submitted,




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